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Abstract: 
In her Vindication of the Rights of Men Mary Wollstonecraft accused 
Edmund Burke of having contempt for his political opponents. Yet she 
herself expressed contempt for Burke and did so unapologetically. Readers 
have long regarded Wollstonecraft’s decision to match Burke’s contempt 
with one of her own as either a tactical blunder or evidence that she 
sought merely to ridicule Burke rather than argue with him. I offer an 
interpretation and defense of Wollstonecraft's rhetorical choices by 
situating the Vindication within eighteenth-century debates about the 
dangers of elite contempt and the best methods for stifling it. Rather than 
countering Burke’s contempt with more of the same, I argue, 
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication marks a distinction between two forms of 
contempt.  The first expresses the false sense of superiority experienced 
by elites who owe their social elevation to arbitrary differences of wealth or 
family. As such, it represents both an abuse of privilege and an anxious 
recognition among elites that their claims to dignity may be unfounded. By 
contrast, the contempt Wollstonecraft directs at Burke represents a 
dignified withdrawal of esteem which signals that one’s opponent is 
unworthy of the dignity to which they lay claim. If Wollstonecraft appeared 
to treat Burke abusively it was because she came to consider this second 
form of contempt as an antidote to the abusive contempt of the privileged. 
I conclude by spelling out some implications of Wollstonecraft’s analysis of 
contempt for recent debates in political theory over the importance of 
dignity to democracy.    
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Wollstonecraft and the Political Value of Contempt 
 
 In the dramatic opening to her Vindication of the Rights of Men, Mary Wollstonecraft 
accused Edmund Burke of passing off ridicule as a ‘test of truth’ in his Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (1989, V: 9).i Far from leading his readers towards truth, she contended, 
Burke’s ridicule was motivated by, and designed to elicit, nothing but contempt. The objects of 
that contempt, in Wollstonecraft’s eyes, ranged from the poor, to the dissenting minister Richard 
Price (whose sermon welc ming the revolution had served as the catalyst for Burke’s polemic), 
to the members of the Assemblée Nationale itself.ii Burke’s repeated attempts to raise a ‘horse 
laugh,’ Wollstonecraft suggested, had far more to do with despising his opponents as unworthy 
than with proving the truth of any claim (1989, V: 7).iii    
Yet, as several readers of the Vindication have pointed out, Wollstonecraft’s attack on 
Burke is itself laced with contempt, a contempt often expressed through ridicule. Time and again 
she heaps mock pity on Burke’s ‘infantile sensibility,’ pleading that she must handle him 
delicately for fear that an overly rigorous debate on a ‘metaphysical’ topic like the rights of man 
would ‘derange’ his ‘nervous system’ (1989, V: 58 and 16).iv This was a contempt, moreover, 
that she openly declared rather than insinuated. The Vindication mimicked the epistle form of 
Burke’s Reflections, with Burke himself standing in as the letter’s addressee. But in sharp 
contrast to the warm opening salutation with which Burke greeted Charles-Jean-Francois Depont 
(his correspondent in Reflections), the Vindication’s greeting placed Burke firmly on guard. In 
what follows, Wollstonecraft warned, she will not only ‘express contempt’ for Burke but will do 
so overtly, rather than concealing her feelings as the ‘equivocal idiom of politeness recommends’ 
(1989, V: 7).   
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How are we to make sense of Wollstonecraft’s upbraiding of Burke for expressing 
contempt, on the one hand, and her unapologetic determination to do precisely the same towards 
him, on the other? And what might answering this question reveal about the place of contempt 
within her political project in the early 1790s? From the moment of its publication a matter of 
weeks after Burke’s Reflections both sympathetic and hostile readers of the Vindication have 
agreed that Wollstonecraft erred by choosing to match Burke’s contempt with one of her own. A 
generous early critic in the English Review drew parallels between the Vindication’s mode of 
attack and that of the Reflections, and worried that Wollstonecraft would be accused of having 
‘repaid’ Burke too much ‘in his own coin’ (Anon., 1791b: 95). William Godwin, who in his own 
much earlier engagement with Burke had been careful to combine criticism of his ‘principles’ 
with respect for Burke’s character, called the work ‘too contemptuous and intemperate’ (1798: 
76).v More recent critics have concurred.vi Janet Todd even found something of a double-
standard at work in Wollstonecraft’s criticism of Burke’s ‘sarcasms,’ suggesting that ‘Burke’s 
attack on Price never stoops to the kind of personal abuse that Wollstonecraft levels at Burke’ 
(Wollstonecraft, 1993: Editor’s note 45). At best, it would seem, Wollstonecraft’s contempt for 
Burke distracted from her arguments for the rights of man and her defense of the revolutionary 
cause. At worst, it revealed her to have been an injudicious or even wantonly abusive critic.  
These criticisms of the Vindication, I aim to show, posit a misleading equivalence 
between Wollstonecraft’s and Burke’s modes of address and in so doing occlude the central role 
played by a particular understanding of contempt in Wollstonecraft’s vision of an egalitarian 
social order. For Wollstonecraft’s eighteenth-century readers, to ‘contemn’ someone was to 
disdainfully regard them as inferior in status or, worse, dismiss them as unworthy of regard at 
all.vii As such, contempt most usually expressed and solidified social hierarchies to the benefit of 
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the elites at their summit.viii In responding to Burke the way she did, I argue, Wollstonecraft 
contested this understanding and called attention to contempt’s ambiguous relationship to social 
inequality. Far from countering Burke’s contempt with an equal or harsher dose of the same, I 
maintain, Wollstonecraft’s Vindication instead marked a distinction between two forms of 
contempt. The first, exemplified by Burke’s attack on the poor, expressed the false sense of 
superiority experienced by those who owe their social elevation to arbitrary differences of wealth 
or family. What is special about this form of contempt, as Wollstonecraft analyzed it, is that it 
represented both an abuse of social privilege and an anxious recognition among elites that their 
claims to esteem are ultimately unfounded.  
By contrast, in her response to Burke, Wollstonecraft strove to express a different sort of 
contempt, one grounded in the conscious dignity of an independent political agent. Those  
trained to express this form of contempt will not be cowed by elite insolence and will prove 
capable of the kind of self-assertion Wollstonecraft deemed vital to social and political freedom. 
If Wollstonecraft neglected to treat Burke civilly or examine his arguments closely, I further 
claim, it was because she came to consider this dignified contempt as itself an antidote to the 
abusive yet anxiety-ridden contempt of the privileged. Though never shedding some early 
reservations about contempt entirely, Wollstonecraft came in the 1790s to recognize its value as 
a form of ‘active non-identification,’ that is, a way of signaling to oneself and one’s audience 
that an opponent is unworthy of the dignity to which they lay claim.ix  
I develop this argument in four stages. First, I show how many of the moral philosophers, 
advice book authors, and educational theorists who influenced Wollstonecraft took issue with the 
habitual contempt shown by the socially privileged towards, in particular, domestic servants and 
the laboring poor. Two principal strategies for countering this behavior emerge from this 
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literature. For the likes of John Locke and James Burgh, such upper class contempt could best be 
quelled by inculcating habits of civility and self-restraint among the children of the rich from a 
young age. Others, however, such as Hester Chapone, proposed that contempt, far from being an 
abuse only, very often betrayed profound psychic insecurities among the privileged who relied 
upon it to extract tokens of homage necessary to their fragile self-esteem. A dignified 
withholding of those tokens, she further implied, could stifle their contempt just as effectively (if 
not more so) than relying on elites’ own self-restraint. 
I turn next to Wollstonecraft’s own educational program to show how she borrowed from 
each of these lines of argument. In both her Thoughts on the Education of Daughters and Female 
Reader, Wollstonecraft proposed that tutors should encourage daughters of the gentry to shun 
contemptuous habits of speech (particularly ridicule) as needlessly cruel and to regard such 
habits as signs of dependence and insecurity. I show subsequently how from the early 1790s 
onwards Wollstonecraft not only deepened this critique of elite behavior but also urged a 
comprehensive reconsideration of how esteem and contempt should be apportioned in English 
society more generally. Returning at last to her contest with Burke, I show how Wollstonecraft’s 
understanding of elite contempt as both abusive and anxiety-laden informed her rhetorical 
choices in attacking Burke’s Reflections, choices justified by an argument contained within the 
Vindication itself. By way of conclusion, I draw out several implications of Wollstonecraft’s 
contempt for recent arguments regarding the indispensability of civic dignity to democratic 
politics, including in particular the following: that achieving a more egalitarian society may 
paradoxically require that the socially marginalized learn to consider themselves of superior 
dignity to those above them in the social order.x  
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I. 
What exactly was contempt and what made it so troubling to Wollstonecraft and other 
social reformers of her day? Contempt, as William Ian Miller remarks, has consistently 
functioned in modern societies as a ‘mechanism’ for ‘ranking people’ (1995: 476). To experience 
contempt in early modernity was to feel not only an aversion towards someone but also an acute 
awareness of one’s own relative superiority. Crucially, this comparative element separated 
contempt from other negative passions such as anger or hatred. Thomas Hobbes, in his 
exhaustive discussion of the passions in Leviathan, was careful to dissociate contempt from 
hatred, defining it instead as a kind of ‘immobility’ of the heart experienced by those whose 
attention had been seized by ‘more potent objects’ (1991: 39). That which is contemptible, 
Hobbes suggested, is simply too ‘inconsiderable’ to stir us much one way or another (1991: 39). 
This made contempt no less fractious than other, more active passions, however. For humans 
craving honor, recognition and acknowledgement of their power, to be confronted with ‘signs of 
contempt, or undervaluing’ was a grave affront (1991: 88). 
If the comparative aspect of contempt was a constant, however, the relevant basis on 
which the comparison should be made was far less certain. Hobbes had found that those who 
lack the ‘goods which men honor’ will invariably be ‘contemned’ (1840, VI: 466). But what 
exactly those ‘goods’ were, or should be, was very much open to debate, especially among those 
Scottish Enlightenment philosophers who so deeply influenced Wollstonecraft.xi David Hume 
defined contempt as an alloy of hatred and pride (with the latter preponderant) and although he 
allowed that strictly speaking anyone could experience this passion, he insisted that the upper 
classes would have occasion to indulge it far more frequently than the lower because wealth was 
universally esteemed whereas poverty was shameful. It is difficult for us, he contended, to regard 
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members of a different social station with ‘indifference’; instead we ‘must’ feel ‘some faint 
touches’ of respect towards the rich and an equal quantity of ‘contempt’ towards the poor (2003: 
252). So strong was this contempt directed towards our social inferiors, in Hume’s view, that the 
rich will strive constantly to ‘keep themselves at a distance’ from those beneath them on the 
social spectrum. Indeed, nothing is more alarming to a rich man, he suggested, than the ‘near 
approach’ of a poor person who fails to acknowledge (or is seemingly unaware) of the 
discrepancy in rank between them (2003: 253).  
Hume’s view that poverty would naturally draw contempt was initially seconded by his 
friend and fellow moral philosopher, Adam Smith. In the first, 1759, edition of The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments Smith largely agreed with Hume that contempt of the rich for the poor, though 
certainly regrettable, was nevertheless compelled by nature. In a chapter entitled ‘Of the origin of 
ambition, and of the distinction of ranks,’ Smith explained how the miseries of poverty were 
compounded by the fact that the better off routinely ‘turn their eyes away’ from the poor and 
take umbrage if one of them should ‘dare’ present themselves in their company (2002: 62). 
Remarkably, Smith presented the poor as only ever experiencing shame rather than resentment at 
this treatment. Because mankind are disposed to ‘sympathize more entirely with our joy than our 
sorrow,’ he stated, we all have a tendency to ‘parade’ our riches and ‘conceal our poverty’ as 
‘mortifying’ (2002: 61-2). Only rarely in this early iteration of Smith’s treatment of the subject 
did he suggest that our despising of the poor or our sympathy with the rich could be anything 
other than natural reflexes.xii    
Not everyone, however, was prepared to accept that the contempt of the rich for the poor 
was natural or inevitable. Even Smith’s doubts about the naturalness of elite contempt deepened 
as he revised The Theory of Moral Sentiments in later years. In a chapter newly added to the 
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sixth edition of 1790, he allowed that the ‘disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich 
and the powerful, and to despise […] persons of a poor and mean condition’ might be 
‘necessary’ to ‘establish the distinction of ranks’ (2002: 72). However, Smith now singled out 
that ‘disposition’ as the ‘most universal cause of the corruption of our moral senses’ (2002: 72). 
What Hume had presented as a more or less natural compulsion, Smith now saw as an injustice 
brought about by mankind’s fixation with ‘wealth and greatness’ (2002: 73). While these 
continue to be valued most, Smith grimly predicted, individuals would be perversely incentivized 
to avoid the contempt of their peers through accumulating material goods, leaving only ‘admirers 
of wisdom and virtue’ to direct contempt towards its ‘proper objects,’ namely ‘vice and folly’ 
(2002: 72-3). 
Smith held out little hope that the fundamental realignment of values required to deflect 
contempt away from the poor would ever occur and offered little advice as to how the corrupting 
influence of elite contempt could be contained. Authors of educational manuals and conduct 
books – genres with which Wollstonecraft was deeply familiar, if not always on good terms – 
were far more forthcoming with suggestions.xiii A basic assumption pervading the education 
literature in particular was that contempt towards the poor was not a reflection of what human 
beings naturally considered honorable or despicable, but rather an artificial vice acquired during 
a corrupted upbringing. John Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education and James Burgh’s 
Thoughts on Education (forerunners to Wollstonecraft’s own Thoughts on Female Education) 
stressed the need to counteract the socially learned contempt that the children of the wealthy 
direct toward those representatives of the poor they most came into contact with, namely 
domestic servants. Locke regretted that so many children were in the habit of inflicting upon 
servants ‘domineering Words, Names of Contempt, and an imperious Carriage; as if they were of 
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another Race, and Species beneath them’ and urgently recommended that such behavior be 
‘weeded out’ early by accustoming children to act with ‘civility’ towards ‘meaner sorts of 
people.’ Failure to do so, Locke warned, would eventually result in adults prone to ‘Oppression 
and Cruelty’ (1996: 92). Burgh similarly deplored how ‘the most laborious, industrious and 
useful part of mankind’ were ‘generally treated with neglect and contempt’ while ‘the idle, the 
inactive and most useless part of the species, I mean, the rich’ were ‘adored as Gods upon earth’ 
(1749: 17). 
Even if contemptu us attitudes persisted beyond childhood, these critics reasoned, adults 
could still be trained to exercise self-restraint and conceal their disdain for those they deemed 
beneath them. This was the view strenuously defended by Godwin in his own contribution to the 
advice and conduct literature. Against those pretending to ‘do homage at the shrine of sincerity’ 
by arguing that hiding disregard for others amounted to hypocrisy, Godwin held that refraining 
from contemptuous talk was in fact a precondition for frank and open debate among equals 
(1793a: 272). A true ‘freedom of opinion,’ he insisted, required not only the absence of legal 
restraint on thought, but also that a certain ‘forebearance’ be ‘moulded into the manners of the 
community [sic].’ As for the argument that frank expressions of contempt could be used to 
educate or reform the morally deviant, Godwin was especially scathing towards it: ‘Who ever 
thought,’ he asked with ample sarcasm of his own, ‘of enlightening his pupil in the truths of 
geometry […] by the cool and biting sarcasms of contempt?’ (1793a: 275).  
If most educational theorists saw contempt as simply abusive, however, others saw in it 
traces of an anxious dependence or even servility. This argument was advanced with special 
force by Hester Chapone, an educational theorist whose influence upon Wollstonecraft looms 
particularly large.xiv In the fourth of her Letters on the Improvement of the Mind (from which 
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 9
Wollstonecraft cited copiously in her Female Reader) Chapone cast serious doubt on Hume’s 
association of contempt with prideful self-satisfaction. Far from expressing a superiority that the 
proud could take easy pleasure in, Chapone argued, contempt could often reveal deep seated 
anxieties on the part of the socially privileged. ‘Pride,’ she begins,   
is, I think, an high opinion of one’s self, and an affected contempt 
of others. I say affected, for that it is not a real contempt is evident 
from this, that the lowest object of it is of importance enough to 
torture the proud man’s heart only by refusing him the homage and 
admiration he requires….[T]he proud man’s contempt of others is 
only assumed with a view to awe them into a reverence by his 
pretended superiority, so it does not preclude an extreme inward 
anxiety about their opinions and a slavish dependence on them for 
all his gratifications (1786: 59-60). 
In this passage contempt is not (or at least not only) an expression of power; it also exposes the 
uneasy dependence of the person expressing it on the very people he is trying to degrade. Hume, 
as we have seen, insisted that the contemptuous will want to put themselves at a certain distance 
from the contemptible. Chapone here offered a refined version of this insight; ‘real contempt’ 
will require distance because its object is truly unworthy of attention. Most of what passes for 
contempt, however, is not of this nature. ‘[F]eigned contempt’ requires that its object be at least 
close enough to respond with the desired signals of respect. A vain man’s ‘airs of insolence and 
contempt,’ Chapone went on to write, really only succeeds in displaying just how desperately he 
‘depend(s) on the breath of the person he would be thought to despise’ (1786: 61). To return to 
Hume’s own example, the rich man’s alarm is caused not by the mere presence of the poor man, 
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but by the latter’s failure to signal acknowledgement of his own inferiority. On Chapone’s 
analysis, and against Hume, such alarm reveals the absence of contempt rather than its presence. 
Real contempt, a contempt thoroughly detached from any desire for recognition, is the preserve, 
the achievement even, of a truly independent agent.  
Notice, however, that Chapone’s analysis also suggested an effective method for 
throwing a puffed up gentleman anxious about his status off balance. Simple refusal of the signs 
of reverence such a man ‘requires’ suffices to lay his dependence bare. A tactical form of 
withholding attention, in other words, could itself be a useful manner of turning the tables on 
elites and exposing their anxieties. When Wollstonecraft pointedly refused to engage Burke’s 
arguments in the Vindication of the Rights of Men, I will argue below, she used a version of this 
strategy to puncture the assumed superiority of her adversary. Before turning to the Vindication, 
however, I look in the beginning of the next section at how Wollstonecraft developed her own 
analysis of elite contempt as brutally harmful, on the one hand, and a symptom of anxious 
dependence, on the other. 
 
II. 
Concerns about the potential of contempt for abuse pervade Wollstonecraft’s earliest 
contribution to the education literature, the 1787 Thoughts on the Education of Daughters. In an 
argument particularly reminiscent of Locke, she claimed there that young society girls who have 
been denied the opportunity to develop virtues worthy of a dignified self-respect will compensate 
through a contemptuous treatment of those they consider inferior, a contempt often expressed 
through ridicule. Alluding, as she would do later in her attack on Burke, to Shaftesbury’s claim 
that ridicule could test for falsehood, Wollstonecraft remarked that if ridicule lived up to its 
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reputation as the ‘boasted test of truth’ then women should excel at increasing human knowledge 
(1989, IV: 13). It quickly becomes apparent, however, that Wollstonecraft had little faith in 
ridicule’s truth-revealing capacities. On the contrary, proneness to ridicule among young women 
results, she regretted, in either ‘trifling conversations’ or the arbitrary infliction of harm on those 
the ridiculers deem ignorant (1989, IV: 13).  
Two years later, in the Female Reader, Wollstonecraft again singled out ridicule as a 
particularly contemptuous (and thus abusive) form of utterance, but this time also portrayed it as 
the preferred weapon of dependent characters anxiously craving recognition. Under the heading 
‘Ridicule’ she placed an excerpt from James Usher’s 1767 Clio, or a Discourse on Taste which 
presented mockery as the refuge of those lacking in genuine self-esteem (or ‘noble pride’) and 
who mistakenly believed that they could ‘rise out of contempt only by the depression of others.’ 
By contrast, the excerpt continues, those who are ‘conscious of their own superior merit […] 
seldom affect ridicule’ (1989, IV: 145). Dignified awareness of one’s own self-worth, 
Wollstonecraft (via Usher) implied, needs no reward, least of all the recognition of others.  
Finally, in the Young Grandison (an educational manual by Madame de Cambon that 
Wollstonecraft translated from the Dutch with significant ‘alterations and improvements’ in 
1790) Wollstonecraft again indicted ridicule as abusive while at the same time showing how a 
fondness for it is indicative of a misplaced sense of superiority.xv A lady who ridiculed a ‘modest 
young gentleman who was a little deformed’ (calling him a ‘spider’ and a ‘little ape’) and who 
‘continued to laugh’ even when her victim showed signs of discomfort will eventually meet her 
comeuppance, Wollstonecraft grimly warned, when the ‘ignorant’ in turn ‘laugh at her’ after the 
physical charms that ground her self-esteem have faded. Learning to base self-esteem on virtue 
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and reason, Wollstonecraft implied, would eradicate such behavior and the dependence that 
drives it (1989, II: 286).  
What emerges from the above is that Wollstonecraft, like her predecessors in the 
education literature, blended a concern with the cruel incivility of contempt with a recognition 
that it could also be a badge of dependence, the default mode of address for those whose sense of 
superiority is buoyed by arbitrary differences of appearance or social status. The early 1790s, 
however, saw Wollstonecraft turn her focus away from educating elites in civility and towards 
enumerating the specific harms done to those most frequently on the receiving end of elite 
contempt, such as women and the poor. No longer was such contempt merely a sign of incivility, 
misplaced pride, or poor education; now it emerged as an instrument of social domination in its 
own right. As Alan Coffee has recently shown, Wollstonecraft was highly attuned to the 
numerous ways in which social attitudes and customs could exercise a form of arbitrary power 
all of their own (2013: 118). Nowhere is this more apparent than in her attack on the custom of 
distributing esteem on the basis of wealth and social rank, a custom that permitted elite contempt 
to have devastating effects on the socially vulnerable.   
Wollstonecraft’s most virulent attack on this custom and the contempt it enabled arrived 
in chapter 9 of the Vindication of the Rights of Woman. The opening lines of the chapter made it 
immediately apparent that Wollstonecraft shared nothing of Hume and the early Smith’s view 
that respecting the rich and despising the poor had any foundation in nature.  Just as Smith 
eventually argued that the poor are despised only because of the premium society places on 
‘wealth and greatness,’ so Wollstonecraft now claimed that contempt only flows downwards in 
accordance with class distinctions because of a widespread and thoroughly unnatural ‘respect 
paid to property’ (1989, V: 211). Strongly echoing Burgh’s complaint that the rich in modern 
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societies are adored as ‘Gods upon earth,’ Wollstonecraft deplored how property, ‘once gained,’ 
entitles its holders to be revered as ‘demi-gods.’ (1989, V: 211). Once property has been thus 
established as the unquestioned basis of esteem within a society, she argued, it becomes all but 
inevitable that the poor and women without property will draw the contempt of propertied men.  
Wollstonecraft does more in this chapter, however, than merely repeat reservations 
voiced earlier in the education literature about the corrupting influence of contempt. Central to 
her analysis was that the ‘undeserved contempt’ to which women especially are subject can be so 
demeaning that its objects may become truly ‘contemptible’ over time (1989, V: 239). Chapone 
had shown that so much of elite contempt was a kind of bluster concealing (or rather revealing) a 
craving for recognition rather than actual superiority. Wollstonecraft’s worry was that even if 
such contempt were groundless initially, those repeatedly forced to endure it would lose self-
respect, resulting eventually in a deformed character that is genuinely worthy of disregard.  It is 
for this reason that Wollstonecraft herself, although often unsparing in her criticism of the 
foppishness and superficiality of high society women, carefully refrained from ridiculing them 
and warned against the dangers of doing so.xvi  
Awareness that the contempt suffered is undeserved, moreover, cannot shield those 
subjected to it from its damaging effects. There are two reasons for this, both of which are 
illustrated by the character of Jemima in Wollstonecraft’s incomplete novel from the mid 1790s, 
The Wrongs of Woman, or Maria. The first is that consciousness that the contempt we suffer is 
ill-deserved will do nothing to prevent our standing in the eyes of society at large from being 
adversely affected, with real material consequences. Jemima, warden in a mental asylum and 
lifelong victim of poverty and abuse, finds that her sister early on ‘conceived a contemptuous 
opinion’ of her precisely because she witnessed others (especially her parents) treating her with 
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contempt (1989, I: 109). An initial expression of contempt, in other words, can be contagious, 
and those who imitate it rarely pause to check whether the original contempt was deserved or 
not. Secondly, the knowledge that others feel contempt towards us can succeed in shaming us, 
Wollstonecraft maintained, even if we are satisfied in ourselves that we have done nothing 
shameful. Upon the death of her elderly benefactor, Jemima is cast out of his house by his heirs 
who mock her grief and accuse her of plotting to steal the deceased’s property. When she 
subsequently asks them for wages she is owed and a character reference (vital to any future 
employment in late eighteenth-century Britain) she is denied on the grounds that it would be 
unconscionable for a lady to recommend a ‘kept mistress’ to anyone. Jemima knows that this 
affront to her reputation is unmerited but this cannot prevent her from shedding ‘burning tears’ 
of shame. For there are, she laments, ‘situations in which a wretch is humbled by the contempt 
they are conscious they do not deserve’ (1989, I: 115). 
We might suspect on the basis of this evidence that Wollstonecraft saw no value in 
contempt whatsoever, or in the forms of speech (like ridicule) most typically used to express 
it.xvii However, a critique of how it had conventionally been abused need not translate into a 
disavowal of contempt as such. Even setting aside for a moment her embrace of contempt in 
responding to Burke (to which I return below) Wollstonecraft’s 1790s writings yield ample 
evidence that she saw value in having the dominated channel a dignified contempt of their own 
towards the very people or structures of power that oppressed them. By implying that those who 
lord it over them from a superior social vantage point are in fact beneath them according to some 
alternative measure of worth, the dominated could both assert their own dignity and call into 
question the very basis upon which social status is allocated in the first place.  In this manner, 
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contempt could be refashioned from a force preserving the status quo into a force for social 
reform.  
If we look again at the Wrongs of Woman, to take a first example, we find Wollstonecraft 
affirming contempt as a resource for those who wish to assert their dignity in defiance of 
oppression. When Jemima’s sympathetic listeners discuss the various deprivations unjustly 
suffered by the poor, Maria’s lover Darnford places at the top of the list the loss of ‘the 
independence of despising their persecutors’ (1989, I: 116). To lose the capacity to despise or 
contemn one’s abusers is symptomatic, Wollstonecraft here implied, of a more general loss of 
independence. We saw above how expressing what Chapone called ‘real contempt’ requires the 
kind of independence of character that wealth or honors (the basis of elite contempt) cannot 
provide. Darnford’s comment reveals how the abject conditions which they are forced to endure 
may eventually deny the poorest members of society the independence necessary to despise 
those who are, at root, the cause of their suffering.      
Wollstonecraft not only drew a connection between the capacity for dignified contempt 
and independence, however. She also explored ways in which such contempt could be actively 
fostered among young women, allowing them to recognize and challenge cultural narratives that 
legitimated the social customs that bound them as dependents to men. In chapter 13 of the 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman Wollstonecraft offered a preliminary sketch of what such an 
education in contempt might look like. Confronting the specific problem of how daughters of the 
gentry could be discouraged from reading ‘flimsy’ novels that presented women as unthinking, 
coquettish, and dependent on arbitrary male power, Wollstonecraft offered the following by way 
of advice: 
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The best method, I believe, that can be adopted to correct a 
fondness for novels is to ridicule them: not indiscriminately, for 
then it would have little effect; but, if a judicious person, with some 
turn for humor, would read several to a young girl, and point out 
both by tones, and apt comparisons […] how foolishly and 
ridiculously they caricatured human nature, just opinions may be 
substituted instead of romantic sentiments (1989, V: 258). 
This is a remarkable proposal on a number of fronts. In the first place, having expressed 
concern in her educational writings from the 1780s that high society women too often indulge a 
taste for ridicule when young, she now created a role for what is in essence a tutor in ridicule. 
Whether the tutor or governess responsible for other aspects of the student’s education could 
play this role depended on whether they could combine judiciousness with a suitable ‘turn for 
humor.’ Admittedly, the ridicule in which the students were to be coached was not the 
personalized or abusive sort that had earlier so animated Wollstonecraft, but this endorsement of 
instruction in ridiculing is no less remarkable for that. Second, given the centrality of a Lockean 
association of ideas to her educational thought as a whole, we know that Wollstonecraft intended 
by this scheme to build ridiculing habits for life (1989, V: 186).xviii If it remained the case that 
young women should refrain from expressing contempt towards undeserving others, it was also 
now evident that confrontations with stereotypes used to justify women’s subordination should 
trigger in Wollstonecraft’s students a response of disdain.xix They were to be trained, in other 
words, to identify cultural products that normalize the artificial social relations so detrimental to 
women’s freedom, and to scoff at them.   
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Notwithstanding Wollstonecraft’s reservations about contempt in her earlier educational 
writings, then, by the 1790s she was defending a form of dignified contempt that could empower 
young women to resist the legal, cultural, and social forces conspiring to warp their characters 
into servility. Notably, others in the radical London circles Wollstonecraft moved in were 
similarly coming to appreciate the potential for contempt to restore dignity to the dominated. In 
1793 Godwin himself, while suspicious (as we have already seen) of contempt in polite 
conversation, also happily observed how the use of ridicule by the poor increasingly disturbed 
the ‘tranquility’ of the upper classes and inspired the ridiculers themselves with the 
‘consciousness of citizenship’ (1793b: 40). For Godwin, reversing the usual flow of contempt by 
directing it against the privileged, in other words, did not have to be an empty consolation for the 
lower orders. It could also go some way towards redressing imbalances of social power by 
placing the privileged in some degree of discomfort, often, as Chapone had already shown, by 
simply refusing them the homage their own contempt was designed to extort. In counteracting 
the psychosocial effects of elite scorn, contempt itself was often the best remedy.     
Grasping the full extent of Wollstonecraft’s analysis of contempt, I maintain, should 
prompt us to reassess her chosen mode of attack on Burke. More specifically, the Vindication’s 
opening criticism of Burke for expressing contempt from the vantage point of privilege should 
brace us for a treatment of him in subsequent pages as simultaneously abusive but also pitifully 
dependent, anxious, and even vulnerable to contempt himself. My aim in the next section is to 
show that this is indeed what Wollstonecraft presents us with.  
 
III. 
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Finding evidence in the Vindication of Wollstonecraft’s concern with the abusive power 
of Burke’s contempt is not especially difficult. ‘Glow[ing],’ as she puts it, ‘with indignation,’ she 
indicts Burke repeatedly for casting down ‘thundering censures’ and the ‘bushfiring of ridicule’ 
upon those less privileged than himself, not least Richard Price, who had been a close friend and 
mentor to Wollstonecraft during her time managing a school at Newington Green (1989, V: 7 
and 40).xx Indignation, however, fuels only a portion of Wollstonecraft’s response to Burke. As 
Martha Nussbaum has argued, indignation, because provoked by some identifiable act of harm, 
usually prompts protests against, or attempts to reform, the afflicter of the harm. More visceral 
emotional reactions like disgust, by contrast, want simply ‘to get the person out of sight’ (2004: 
106). We have already seen that contempt, as Wollstonecraft’s contemporaries conceived of it, 
manifested itself as a desire to place considerable distance between oneself and whatever one 
finds contemptible. When Wollstonecraft announces to Burke that his ridicules of Price have 
earned her contempt, we should expect nothing else than that she will regard Burke thereafter as 
unworthy of engagement and pass over much of what he wrote as not worth her attention (1989, 
V: 44). True to that initial promise, Wollstonecraft time and again sidesteps substantial 
engagement with the details of Burke’s arguments and does so unapologetically.  
Readers of the Vindication are treated to an example of such a deliberate withholding of 
attention in the very first sentence. Wollstonecraft, again making her intention explicit, dispenses 
with the marks of respect usually prefaced to replies of this sort, especially from authors of a 
social standing inferior to that of the addressee. She will not, she tells Burke, apologize for 
‘intruding’ on his ‘precious time’ (1989, V: 7). Nor will she declare that it is ‘an honor’ to 
discuss the rights of man with someone of Burke’s literary abilities. Her opening sally then, is 
not an indignant complaint, but a calm withholding of pleasantries conventionally due on such 
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occasions. The refusal of honorifics, however, has only just begun. Even after such an opening, 
Wollstonecraft’s readers might still have expected her to refute the ‘specious’ arguments from 
Burke that roused her ‘indignation’ in the first place (1989, V: 5). But they would be largely 
disappointed. In spite of the damage his arguments have wrought in her eyes, she ultimately 
concludes that it would be too ‘tedious’ to try her own patience and that of her readers by 
pointing out their flaws (1989, V: 59).  
It this precisely this strategy of evasion that has so frustrated critics of the Vindication 
then and since.xxi It is a strategy, however, that Wollstonecraft amply justified over the course of 
the text. The Vindication, I maintain, contains a coherent argument as to why most members of 
the upper classes should be denied the esteem they so anxiously crave by those beneath them 
socially. So long as the prevailing system of unnatural social distinctions persists, Wollstonecraft 
argued, the middle class in particular will have prima facie grounds for regarding themselves as 
superior in dignity to, rather than the mere equals of, the rich. The Vindication, we will see, 
served not only as an example of how propertied elites can be treated with contempt by a social 
inferior, but also presented a case for why they usually should be. In other words, Wollstonecraft 
attempted more than merely cutting Burke down to size; she argued for a wholesale rethinking of 
the manner in which contempt should be distributed in a class-based society.xxii     
Upon what grounds did she so argue? As with so many of Wollstonecraft’s arguments, 
this one concerned education (broadly conceived as the set of environmental factors that 
contribute to a person’s moral and intellectual development). At its core was the following claim: 
the pampered upbringing enjoyed by the rich actually deprives them of sufficient opportunities to 
develop the capacities necessary for a rational exchange between citizens on matters of public 
importance. In this respect, the very rich and very poor have something in common. The social 
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conditions of both groups (debasing physical labor for the one and complete lack of material 
want for the other) have conspired to deny them an education adequate to the demands of a free 
society and left them in a state of dependence. Yet in spite of the fact that both groups are 
dependent, only the poor routinely experience contempt. The deference granted as a matter of 
course to the rich allows them to overlook their own debility and artificially props up their self-
esteem. By continuing to revere the rich in this manner, Wollstonecraft claimed, her 
contemporaries reinforced wealth as an artificial basis of social esteem, contributed to the further 
debasement of the most vulnerable in society, and lent overall legitimacy to a corrupt social 
order.    
It is this argument that propelled Wollstonecraft’s insistence, early in the Vindication, 
that the category of the ‘vulgar’ (a term Burke regularly deployed in the Reflections to describe 
the poor or uneducated) be expanded to include the rich. ‘[B]y this epithet,’ she declared, ‘I 
mean not only to describe a class of people, who, working to support the body, have not had time 
to cultivate their minds’ but ‘likewise those who, born in the lap of affluence, have never had 
their invention sharpened by necessity’ and so become ‘creatures of habit and impulse’ (1989, V: 
16). Poverty and affluence, Wollstonecraft here claimed, each work to mould individuals into 
dependence, albeit by different means. Later in the Vindication she reiterated the claim. Taking 
Burke to task for deriding the women who marched on Versailles as ‘furies of hell’ while 
reserving pity for Marie Antoinette, she again established a surprising equivalence between 
poverty and privilege where most would have seen only difference. The ‘great and small vulgar’ 
have equal claim on ‘our pity,’ she wrote, because both have ‘insuperable obstacles to surmount 
in their progress towards true dignity of character’ (1989, V: 30). The obstacles confronting the 
rich may be less obvious, Wollstonecraft suggested, but they are no less formidable for that. ‘Is it 
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among the list of possibilities,’ she rhetorically asked, ‘that a man of rank and fortune can have 
received a good education’ when his ‘wants are instantly supplied’ and (repeating a phrase from 
earlier) his ‘invention is never sharpened by necessity’ (1989, V: 42)? For Wollstonecraft, to be 
granted everything at a young age is in the long run to be denied much, including the chance to 
develop the ‘true dignity’ needed to inoculate against contempt.     
The dependence that causes the rich to later express contempt as a way to paper over their 
insecurities is thus bred into them from the very beginning. In making this claim Wollstonecraft 
sided with her predecessors in the education literature who had insisted that elite contempt was 
an acquired vice rather a reflection of a natural human tendency to admire wealth and scorn 
poverty. Unlike them, however, she voiced skepticism as to whether early tutoring in civility and 
self-restraint could offset the debilitating effects of entrenched privilege. The ‘tutors and 
chaplains’ entrusted with the education of noble children command such little respect, she 
maintained, that they more closely resemble ‘jesters’ serving as a ‘whetstone for the blunt wit of 
the noble peer who patronizes them’ (1989, V: 38). Because they themselves are usually 
beholden to a system of patronage spawned by the division of classes, most tutors cannot be 
relied upon to educate their charges into independence and dignity. The result is a class of 
dependent and undignified people, anxiously seeking acknowledgement of their spurious claims 
to superior status.   
By recasting an upbringing in a wealthy home as both a privilege and a disadvantage 
from which it is extremely difficult to recover, Wollstonecraft thus made a case in the 
Vindication for treating the rich, not with the signs of homage to which they accustomed, but 
rather with the same kind of ‘pity bordering on contempt’ that she poured down on Burke.xxiii It 
was a case she would make again two years later when composing the Vindication of the Rights 
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of Woman. The ‘middle classes,’ she there argued, ‘appear to be in the most natural state.’ They 
have been spared both the debilitating effect of poverty and the enfeebling effects of wealth. The 
‘great’ by contrast, ‘have the strongest claim to pity’ (1989, V: 75). Denied the chance to 
‘practice the duties which dignify the human character’ they are left ‘vain and helpless’ (1989, 
V: 75). Consequently, Wollstonecraft proposed adopting ‘a separate view of the different ranks 
of society’ rather than pretending that characters produced by each will possess equal dignity 
(1989, V: 75). 
There is, then, an argumentative thread concerning the appropriate manner of regarding 
the idle rich that runs from one Vindication to the next. Over the course of the two works, 
Wollstonecraft built a case for treating those rich not as, at base, similar to the rest of society, but 
as fundamentally deprived by their upbringing of a dignity that lies within reach of the majority. 
As such, far from being entitled to the esteem they lay claim to, the rich are deserving of the very 
same disregard they normally exhibit towards the poor and vulnerable. Once this argument is 
borne in mind, then Wollstonecraft’s attack on Burke appears less like an intemperate outburst 
than an exemplary mode of address that she wished others to imitate.  
  It might immediately be objected that if Wollstonecraft had wanted to justify contempt 
towards an idle upper class incapacitated by their pampered upbringings, then she could have 
chosen a better target than Edmund Burke. As she herself concedes, Burke was born without title 
and his rise to prominence was achieved largely on merit.xxiv This, in Wollstonecraft’s eyes, 
however, only made his defection to the side of property all the more troubling. Burke had made 
that defection explicit in the Reflections, urging that possession of landed property be retained as 
the primary basis for the distribution of esteem within English society over and against the 
claims of ability. Against the Marquis de Barentin’s proclamation at the opening of the Estates 
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General that ‘all occupations were honorable,’ Burke bluntly retorted that the ‘occupation of an 
hair-dresser’ or a ‘working tallow-chandler’ simply ‘cannot be a matter of honor to any person’ 
(1993: 49). To suggest otherwise was not to challenge a ‘prejudice’ but to ‘war with nature’ itself 
(1993: 49). Burke’s immediate rhetorical purpose in these lines was to subject arguments for 
equal rights to a reductio ad absurdum: to press for political equality is to press eventually for 
even those in the lowliest of occupations to take up the reins of government. But though he 
would later clarify that he did not wish to exclusively ‘confine power, authority and distinction to 
blood, and names, and titles,’ Burke continued in the Reflections to weigh in heavily on the side 
of property against what he called the ‘invasion of ability’ (1993: 50-51). Thus even if Burke had 
not been born into the idle upper class, Wollstonecraft had reason to believe he had opted to 
make himself a tool of it. When she accused Burke of lacking ‘enlightened self-love’ she meant 
precisely that he had lost the self-esteem that came from living a dignified, independent 
existence (1989, V: 34). Having embraced the dependence that came from being at or near the 
apex of a corrupt social order, Wollstonecraft maintained, Burke could no longer be expected to 
reason as an equal. Indeed, it would be ‘cowardice’ to oblige him to do so (1989, V: 10). 
 
IV. 
 
The audacity and even ferocity of the Vindication of the Rights of Men should not blind 
us to the fact that it contains arguments. One of those arguments, I have contended, concerns 
how contempt should ideally be apportioned in the England of Wollstonecraft’s day and on what 
basis. Macalester Bell has recently claimed that ‘a society completely lacking status distinctions’ 
would be one in which ‘contempt could not exist’ (2013: 38). Wollstonecraft saw no such society 
on the horizon in the 1790s. Her affirmation of contempt in confronting Burke suggests that her 
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vision of an egalitarian social order allowed considerable room for legitimate claims to higher 
dignity or status. This, however, begs the wider question of what kind of status distinctions 
should persist in a society committed to equality. If, as many political theorists have argued, 
recognition of equal dignity is foundational to modern democracy, then we might well ask 
whether a passion like contempt that thrives upon status distinctions should not be dismissed as 
an unfortunate remnant of a more hierarchical social order.xxv To defend equal dignity, in other 
words, must we do away with contempt entirely? In closing, I draw on Wollstonecraft’s analysis 
to address this difficulty head-on and explain how contempt can be re-imagined as a democratic 
virtue rather than an aristocratic vice.   
To answer the charge that contempt is inimical to democratic aspirations we need first 
recall that not all status distinctions threaten the kind of dignity necessary to sustain democracy.  
A society free of the degrading behaviors that sap the independence needed for citizenship may 
still allow, or even encourage, contests over dignity. Josiah Ober has recently shown that ‘civic 
dignity’ (understood as ‘equal high standing among citizens’) is compatible with significant 
competition for status based on merit or excellence (2012: 829).xxvi Pushing this claim still 
further, he argues that if heroic public actions that protect the dignity of all citizens can win 
public acclaim then intense status contests among prominent citizens may even support civic 
dignity. Overlooked by Ober, however, is that citizens suffering various forms of domination − 
and thus prevented from performing such prestigious public actions − may still contribute to a 
more democratic order by expressing contempt for those who are well positioned to support 
civic dignity but who instead lord it over their social inferiors, much as Wollstonecraft accused 
Burke of doing. In other words, while Ober is correct that democracy is strengthened when 
citizens applaud those who uphold civic dignity, Wollstonecraft showed how it can also gain 
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from citizens who regard with contempt those whose who actively undermine that dignity by 
humiliating those beneath them. 
 Even if we concede, however, that the kind of contempt Wollstonecraft showed towards 
Burke is a legitimate response to those who menace civic dignity, it might still be objected that 
the risks posed to civility by contempt remain too formidable for us to endorse it without 
misgivings.  ‘Mutual contempt,’ as Teresa Bejan and Bryan Garsten have rightly noted, ‘can 
corrode the affective bonds of democratic citizenship’ (2014: 18). Indeed, it would be difficult to 
describe as democratic any society in which citizens routinely demeaned one another or refused 
to at least formally recognize each other as equals. Before rushing to impeach contempt as such, 
however, Wollstonecraft reminds us to take stock of who is being harmed by contempt in any 
given instance. There is a danger, her analysis suggests, in treating all expressions of contempt as 
equally objectionable. If we acknowledge, for instance, that contempt for the socially 
marginalized can compound their subjection by undercutting their capacity for independence, 
then we need to treat this as a qualitatively different kind of injury than any contempt the 
privileged might suffer. A blanket appeal for citizens to withhold expressing contempt could 
smother these crucial differences.    
 More important still, Wollstonecraft’s analysis helps us see how expressions of contempt 
are always reflections of deeper economies of value. Before asking what kinds of slanders, 
defamations, ridicules or slurs qualify as civil and which do not, we might instead interrogate the 
set of goods possession of which nearly always guarantee members of a society the esteem of 
their peers. In a society in which wealth is treated as a mark of prestige, formal equality under 
the law or even a wide commitment to civility will not prevent contempt from being directed 
towards the materially deprived. If Hume was correct that contempt forms on the basis of a 
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comparison between ourselves and others then something has to serve as the basis of that 
comparison. Wollstonecraft stressed the need for us to continually evaluate the true worth of 
whatever that esteem-conferring good might be. And even if Smith was right that, in commercial 
societies at least, displacing wealth as the principal font of esteem will prove next to impossible, 
expressing contempt for those rich who either fail to uphold or deliberately undermine civic 
dignity may be one way to signal that the dominance of wealth over our esteem need not be total.  
 Finally, Wollstonecraft suggests a surprising connection between contempt and the 
character traits necessary for citizens to strive for freedom from domination. Recent scholarship 
has rightly sought to fold Wollstonecraft’s Vindications into a republican tradition that 
conceptualizes freedom as non-domination and independence from arbitrary power.xxvii Less 
examined in that literature, however, have been the specific resources Wollstonecraft offered for 
resisting domination and establishing the social conditions in which freedom may be enjoyed. 
Wollstonecraft’s educational program for young girls suggests that a training in contempt may 
enable the oppressed to better recognize (and defy) the forces that render them vulnerable to 
domination in the first place. That this has been overlooked may in part be due to 
Wollstonecraft’s own success in exposing the ways in which contempt more often than not 
facilitated domination by (especially) the socially privileged. Once we come to better appreciate 
the multiple forms that contempt can take, however, then it becomes apparent that those who 
have been debased by contempt may be the same people who stand to gain most from learning to 
exercise it themselves against their oppressors.  
Note that such an education in contempt need not entail stoking class antagonisms. The 
dignified contempt that Wollstonecraft espoused is not hatred; nor is it resentment. Both of these 
passions are typically responses to an injury or specific harm, and both can have debilitating 
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effects on whoever is in the grip of them. Contempt, on the other hand, need not be reactive and 
can instead be nurtured as a settled disposition derived from a consciousness of one’s own 
superior dignity with regard to some compromised other.xxviii Wollstonecraft was moved to anger 
by Burke’s harsh treatment of Richard Price. Her contempt, however, was reserved for the idle 
rich more generally and stemmed from a considered view that neither wealth nor blood should 
serve as the dominant basis of respect in a civilized society. It was a contempt she was harshly 
judged for when she first expressed it. Her vindication is long overdue.  
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Notes  
                                                 
i All Wollstonecraft references (unless stated otherwise) are to Janet Todd and Marliyn Butler’s 1989 seven volume 
The Works of Mary Wollstonecraft. Volume numbers are included as roman numerals in the parentheses followed by 
the relevant page number. 
ii Wollstonecraft reprimands Burke twice for treating Price with contempt (1989, V:18 and 44), twice for the 
contempt he shows towards the poor (1989, V: 21 and 55) and once for his treatment of the Assemblée Nationale 
deputies (1989, V: 40).     
iii The argument that recourse to ridicule is a poor substitute for argument recurs throughout Wollstonecraft’s corpus. 
See for instance her criticism, in her Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution, of the French habit of 
using ‘sharpened wit’ to counter arguments ‘with which they have not strength fairly to wrestle’ (1989, VI: 228). 
iv On the ‘wry sense of humor’ that pervades Wollstonecraft’s writings see Botting (2014: 262). 
v In his Defense of the Rockingham Party, Godwin expressed disagreement with Burke’s ‘aristocratic principles’ but 
went out of his way not to ‘question the integrity of any man, upon account of his tenets, whether in religion or 
politics’ (1783: 30). He even expressed concern that Burke had been the victim of ‘superficial raillery and abuse’ 
(1783: 35). The contrast with Wollstonecraft’s approach to Burke could hardly be starker. 
vi Ralph Wardle maintained that Wollstonecraft subjected Burke to ‘sheer abuse’ rather than arguing with him 
(1951: 118). Virginia Sapiro similarly saw ‘haste’ and ‘anger’ in Wollstonecraft’s rhetorical choices (1992: 201). 
Not everyone, however, has taken issue with Wollstonecraft’s tone. Amartya Sen has praised Wollstonecraft for her 
‘quite remarkable’ way of ‘combining wrath and reasoning in the same work’ (2009: 392). I share Sen’s admiration 
but disagree that ‘wrath’ is the only or even predominant passion on display in Wollstonecraft’s Vindications.   
vii Nearly all dictionaries in the mid to late eighteenth century emphasize both despising and disregarding as core 
ingredients in contempt. Johnson’s Dictionary of 1755 defined the verb ‘contemn’ as ‘to despise, to scorn, to slight, 
to disregard, to neglect to defy’ and equated contempt with ‘the act of despising’ (1755). John Ash’s New and 
Complete Dictionary of 1775 followed suit by including ‘despise’ and ‘neglect’ in the definition of contempt (1775).      
viii Although Don Herzog has shown that because there are many ‘different dimensions along which one might 
qualify as high’ contempt was ‘a furiously contested battleground’ (2000: xiii and 189). 
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ix I take the term ‘active non-identification’ from Bell (2013: 53). 
x For a defense of civic dignity as a cardinal value of democracy see Ober (2012). 
xi On Wollstonecraft and Scottish Enlightenment philosophy see O’Neill (2007). 
xii At I.3.2 Smith hints that our ‘state of deference’ towards the rich is merely ‘habitual,’ while in the same paragraph 
referring to our ‘natural disposition to respect them’ (2002: 64). 
xiii On Wollstonecraft’s fraught relationship with these literatures see Jones (2002).  
xiv Wollstonecraft selected numerous passages from Chapone’s 1773 Letters on the Improvement of the Mind when 
compiling her Female Reader, a compendium of ‘Miscellaneous Pieces, in Prose and Verse’ chosen ‘from the Best 
Writers for the Improvement of Young Women’ (1989, IV: 53). More telling still, Wollstonecraft exempted 
Chapone from some of the more scathing criticisms she leveled against female educational theorists in chapter 5 of 
the Vindication of the Rights of Woman, a chapter devoted to censuring ‘writers who have rendered women objects 
of pity, bordering on contempt.’ While Wollstonecraft saw most educational manuals as complicit in the degrading 
of women, Chapone’s Letters, she there remarks, ‘contain so many useful observations that I only mention them to 
pay the worthy writer this tribute of respect,’ a remarkable endorsement given the generally critical tone of this 
portion of the Vindication (1989, V:147 and 174). 
xv Wollstonecraft’s translations can safely be read as expressing her own views. As Sylvana Tomaselli writes: ‘the 
texts she produced were as if her own, not just because she agreed with the ideas put forward, but because she more 
or less re-wrote their contents’ (2012: 237). 
xvi Throughout the Vindication of the Rights of Woman Wollstonecraft held firm to the conviction that even women 
who surrender their independence through an unhealthy ‘attachment to rakes’ should not be ‘satirized’ on the basis 
of faults that are the result of their education (1989, V: 118). See also chapter 13, Section III, where Wollstonecraft 
warns that to ‘laugh at […] or satirize the follies of a being who is never allowed to act freely from the light of her 
own reason is as absurd as cruel’ (1989, V: 260).  
xvii On the use of ridicule by elites to cow social inferiors in the eighteenth century see Dickie (2011: chapter 5). 
xviii Commenting on this passage Saba Bahar notes that the students would in time ‘internalise this authoritative 
counsel and ridicule’ (2002: 115). 
xix For the importance of association to Wollstonecraft’s educational outlook see chapter 6 of the Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman.   
xx Towards Price, Wollstonecraft seethed, Burke was a bully, showing no qualms about subjecting an ageing 
minister then ‘tottering on the verge of the grave,’ to ‘willful’ and ‘wanton abuse’ (1989, V: 18-19). 
xxi An anonymous reviewer complained that from Wollstonecraft’s title page ‘we expected this work would have 
been confined to an examination of Mr Burke’s political principles. This, however, occupies but a small part of the 
whole’ (1791b: 96).  
xxii Miller has coined the phrase ‘upward contempt’ to describe the contempt shown by those lower on the social 
spectrum towards their social superiors (1995: 476).  
xxiii This phrase occurs in the title of chapter 5 of the Vindication of the Rights of Woman. 
xxiv Whereas most gain prominence through ‘fortune and hereditary office,’ Wollstonecraft writes, ‘you [Burke] have 
raised yourself by exertion and abilities’ (1989, V: 43). 
xxv George Kateb in particular has insisted that what he calls the ‘existential’ value of human dignity must be central 
to any robust defense of human rights (2014: 10). 
xxvi Ober draws heavily on Jeremy Waldron’s argument that the high standing conveyed by the word dignity has now 
been extended (at least in theory) from aristocrats to all members of society (Waldron, 2012). 
xxvii On Wollstonecraft’s republican understanding of freedom see Coffee (2013) and Halldenius (2007: 80-84).  
xxviii Asserting one’s dignity need not always be an expression of independence or freedom. As Michael Rosen has 
pointed out, in Catholic thought in particular the poor were recognized as having their own dignity, but it was a 
dignity they possessed by virtue of occupying a place in a ‘properly ordered hierarchy’ (2012: 18).  
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